Stalin's War: A New History of World War II Hardcover – April 20, 2021

Historian Sean McMeekin’s Stalin’s War is a riveting, revisionist history of World War 2, drawing on previously-classified Soviet archives. It’s Stalin- rather than Hitler-centric and takes some of the luster off the Big Three.McMeekin makes a persuasive case the Soviet Union won WW2, takes the lionized Churchill down a peg, and reveals FDR’s conduct as cringeworthy.Stalin was cut from a different cloth. He bifocally and ruthlessly pursued current and post-war objectives. Russia under the cloak of the USSR finished the war a superpower and was the only major belligerent that gained territory and vassal states. And, the Soviets amassed enormous industrial assets and technology from US Lend-Lease gifts and by looting occupied lands. While the Soviet Union suffered horrendous losses, Stalin, hailed as the Vozhd (leader), who’d murdered millions of his own countrymen and conquered subjects, didn’t lose a wink of sleep over it.British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain observed the Soviets didn’t share Western values, were “afraid of Germany and Japan, and would be delighted to see other people fight them.” Stalin said it was in the USSR’s interests that “war breaks out between the Reich and the capitalist Anglo-French bloc,” noting “everything should be done so that (the war) drags out as long as possible with the goal of weakening both sides.”Stalin’s philosophy of weakening countries viewed as foes, prey, or situational and temporary allies, informed his policies.Under the 1939 Molotov/Ribbentrop Pact, Europe’s two great evil-doers Hitler and Stalin agreed to carve up Eastern Europe. The Vozhd thought it would entice the Führer to attack Poland and provoke war with Britain and France.Lenin’s successor got his wish.Britain and France declared war on Nazi Germany on the principle that it had invaded Poland. But after letting the Wehrmacht devastate Poland’s armed forces, jackal-like, the Red Army rushed in to seize more than half the country. Stalin was no less guilty of ending Poland’s sovereignty than the Führer. The Vozhd promptly shipped thousands of Poles off to camps, many for execution. He harbored a visceral hatred for the Poles which McMeekin speculates stemmed from their besting the Red Army in the 1919-20 Russo-Polish War. By June, 1941 the Soviets had murdered 500,000 in occupied Poland. Neither Britain nor France, however, declared war on the USSR.After Poland’s fall, Stalin garrisoned, and later occupied, the Baltic States. In June, 1940 the Soviet Union invaded and occupied Romanian Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. By August 300,000 Romanians had been shipped off to the Gulag.Before the Führer attacked the USSR, the Vozhd’s armies had seized territory from or swallowed whole Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Poland, and Manchuria.McMeekin notes Hitler refused Stalin’s demands for more territorial concessions from still independent countries between the jaws of the totalitarian rivals, while the US and UK acceded to his enslaving Eastern Europe.After the Soviets invaded Finland in November, 1939, Britain considered bombing the Baku oil fields to deny Hitler’s and Stalin’s war machines oil. There’s an eerie parallel between 21st-century Russian dictator Vladimir Putin’s attempt to conquer Ukraine, and the Vozhd’s invasion of Finland.McMeekin comments wistfully that “the Finnish cause had the potential to transform the so-far desultory and hypocritical British-French resistance to Hitler alone into a principled war against armed aggression by both totalitarian regimes,” with the possibility of pulling Italy, Spain, and Japan in, with US support.It was not to be.Stalin overestimated the Anglo-French bloc’s armed forces and underestimated the Germans’ military prowess and elan. While the French army had more mobilized soldiers, tanks – many qualitatively superior, and artillery, Hitler’s generals steamrollered it in six weeks. Two days before France’s surrender Mussolini opportunistically declared war on France and Britain. That changed the calculus. Standing alone, Britain wasn’t in a position to take on the two great totalitarian powers and Fascist Italy.Of Europe’s two great 20th-century monsters, Stalin was the more calculating, cautious, intellectual, and, ultimately, the more consequential. He and his malign protégées killed and subjugated far more people than Hitler.The USSR’s enslavement of Eastern Europe lasted 46 years after the stake was driven into the heart of Hitlerism. With Putin’s panzers rolling over Ukraine, Eastern Europe is again at risk. In contrast, today Germany is a pacifistic – for its allies too pacifistic, democratic member of the West.Stalin’s ambitions were global.In the Far East when Imperial Japan gained ground against the Nationalist Chinese, he intervened to balance the contest, looking to put Mao in the pole position after the war. In 1939 in the Battle of Khalkhin Gol the Red Army bloodied the Japanese Kwantung Army, effectively ending its plans to invade Siberia.In April, 1941 the Vozhd persuaded Tokyo to sign the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, and encouraged it to strike south against Britain and America. Influenced by Soviet agents like Harry Dexter White, the US pushed Japan toward war, a war which might not otherwise have been inevitable. He was far from the only Soviet agent and sympathizer influencing Anglo-American policies to Stalin’s benefit.Before WW2 FDR sought improved relations with the Vozhd. In 1936 he replaced his Moscow ambassador and Stalin realist William Bullit with “a Soviet sympathizer” Joseph Davies. At Davies’ urging FDR purged the State Department’s Eastern European affairs division of hard-nosed Soviet experts.The alliance of convenience between Nazi Germany and the Communist USSR was never going to last. The question was always who would strike first. In June, 1941 the Führer launched Operation Barbarossa. While the USSR had vastly more soldiers, and tanks, artillery, and aircraft, many qualitatively superior, the Wehrmacht blitzkrieg advanced rapidly on a broad front, inflicting massively-disproportionate casualties, captured millions of Red Army soldiers, and, but for winter and Western aid might have finished Stalin that year.The Vozhd had assumed his eventual war would be with the weakened the victor of the struggle between Nazi Germany and the Anglo-French bloc.McMeekin describes Churchill and FDR as intoxicated with Stalin. Roosevelt’s intoxication was more acute. When Hitler invaded the Soviet Union, Churchill’s relief overcame his hostility to Bolshevism. FDR courted Stalin, adopting a see-no-evil, hear-no-evil mindset toward him, and denying him nothing. The Vozhd relentlessly pressed Roosevelt for and received ever-increasing aid, treated him roughly, and refused his meek requests.After Pearl Harbor the US declared war on Japan. To Churchill’s and Stalin’s delight, the Führer promptly declared war on the sleeping giant America, notwithstanding that Japan refused to wage war on the USSR, with which he was engaged in a war of annihilation. It is inconceivable the Vozhd would have made such a rash monumental strategic blunder.In Eastern Europe and China, the Vozhd supported his proxies, with the Red Army, arms, and by undermining Anglo-American support for competing anti-Communist anti-Axis forces.Influenced by Soviet-sympathizing advisers and agents Churchill betrayed Serb royalist Draza Mihailovic and the Chetniks, who’d organized the initial resistance to the German occupation, for Stalin’s man Tito. Churchill and FDR pulled the rug out from under Stanislaw Mikolajczyk and the London Poles. Other than worrying about upsetting millions of Polish-American voters, Roosevelt was willing to feed Poland into the maw of Stalinism. Heroic Poles fought the Nazis and Soviets – the Soviets during and for several years after WW2. Poland lost a greater percent of its population than any other country, only to be crushed under the Bolshevik boot of oppression.FDR hagiography paints him as the president who saved America from the Great Depression and the free world from Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, and Fascist Italy.Burton Folsom Jr in New Deal or Raw Deal, Amity Shlaes in the Forgotten Man: A New History of the Great Depression, and Jim Powell in FDR’s Folly: How Roosevelt and His New Deal Prolonged the Great Depression persuasively contend contrary to popular history, that he prolonged and deepened the Great Depression.McMeekin draws back the curtain on FDR the war leader. His feckless and fawning treatment of Stalin and decisions cost millions of lives, resulted in hundreds of millions of people being enslaved by Stalin, and ushered in the Cold War.Anglo-American aid to Stalin was never conditioned on behavior. The Soviets were a cobelligerent only because of a shared enemy, not shared values or post-war objectives. Stalin’s naked imperial aggressions, atrocities, and interning US airmen as POWs, were clarion warnings.The time to condition aid to Stalin to ensure a better post-war world was early, in 1942 or 1943, at the latest in 1944, always bearing in mind he was completely untrustworthy.With Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, Henry Kissinger’s quip about Saddam Hussein’s Iraq’s war with the Islamic Republic of Iran, it’s too bad they both can’t lose, is apropos. Then Senator Harry Truman expressed that sentiment on the Senate floor in 1941.Hitler lost WW2. Perhaps there was no scenario where Stalin too would have lost WW2. However, he didn’t have to win. He didn’t have to be permitted to enslave Eastern Europe and install Communist regimes in China and North Korea.While threatening to deny aid to Churchill if he didn’t bend the knee on policy, FDR refused to condition aid to Stalin.He childishly, stubbornly, and against the advice of his military advisors and allies, demanded unconditional surrender. McMeekin speculates this may have been driven by an impulsive desire to prove his bona fides to the Vozhd.From 1943 senior German military officers made multiple approaches to the West to negotiate surrendering. Allied victory was inevitable, but a negotiated surrender, which let Anglo-American armies advance to the Eastern Front, would have saved lives, as well as giving liberal Western-oriented governments a chance up to the Soviet border. FDR, however, rejected all peace entreaties. Allied and Axis soldiers and civilians died needlessly.During this period Stalin approached Hitler about a separate peace, which the Führer rejected.In contrast with the noble principles embodied by the Atlantic Charter, FDR stubbornly demanded the punitive Morgenthau Plan and executing captured Germany soldiers, which stiffened Germany resistance in the West, which was in nobody’s interest but Stalin’s.FDR turned a blind eye to Stalin’s butchery, greenlighted his subjugation of Poland, and waxed about an independent “Sovietized” India.Roosevelt also rejected proposals to put Anglo-American troops as far east as possible, to save as much of Eastern Europe and the Balkans as possible from Stalin’s tender mercies.While FDR professed affection for the Nationalist Chinese, he prioritized sending tanks, trucks, jeeps, artillery, guns, aircraft, oil, whole factories, and even uranium, to Stalin. The Vozhd wanted the Chiang’s army, which tied down the bulk of Japan’s army, bled so it would be easy pickings for Mao’s Communists. Stalin always and everywhere aimed to maximize the Soviets’ post-war position and power. Roosevelt seemed to give it nary a thought. Churchill saw Britain as dependent on FDR and Stalin. His idée fixe was to sustain the Grand Alliance against Hitler.Even after VE Day accommodating Stalin continued. Under morally-repugnant “Operation Keelhaul” Anglo-American troops handed over 2.3 million “Soviet subjects,” to Stalin, knowingly sending them to almost-certain deaths.One can only wonder how differently WW2 might have played out with a different leader in the White House. If America had been led by a hard-nosed strategic president thinking to win the war(s) on terms most advStalin’s War is a compelling read and offers invaluable and timeless lessons on bringing moral clarity and realism to statecraft and war.

The book is very detailed, especially when discussing Lend-Lease, what was shipped, what was lost at sea, what arrived, how it arrived, etc. I had often believed that the German advance was stopped due to a combination of autumn rains, the muddy steppe, cold winter, and the industrial capacity of the USSR and the fighting ability of the Red Army. This book convinced me that without American-British lend-lease shipments to the USSR the Germans very likely would have knocked Stalin out of the Big Four.After falling in the past few years under the spell of the belief that it was the USSR that stood alone against Germany while Stalin's allies were playing around the margins in tertiary theaters, I can say that I've returned to my original beliefs in the importance of American and British efforts in North Africa and Italy. Hitler was curiously keen on countering those "unimportant" offensives by canceling Operation Citadel and pulling divisions off the eastern front in 1943 and then pulling even more divisions in 1944 in response to Operation Overlord, just in time for Bagration to be launched.The author also discusses the hesitancy of the French and British to attack the Soviet oilfields in 1939 and 1940 when the USSR was still Germany's ally. It is this question that puts the idea of "The Good War" out the window because the ostensible reason for the war was that Germany continued to invade country after country and yet Stalin never got the same hostile treatment for allying with Germany and, as the book demonstrates, invading just as many countries as Germany in the same time frame and conquering more territory than them. The author contends that Britain and America were engaging in realpolitik as they refused to hold their (eventual) ally to a different set of standards for reasons of political expediency. In his opinion there wasn't a terribly good reason for that belief on the part of Churchill and Roosevelt.There's really too much detail in this book and too many good things to say about it. If you're like me and like to flip back to the notes every time you come across a citation the book will take you quite a while to get through as the notes section is around 150 pages. However it was fairly well-written and, as long as you are fine with a little anti-Stalin bias (I know, unthinkable; at least it is rare in the book that the author takes it too far), it's a fun book to read.

Zusammenfassung: Hier wird der zweite Weltkrieg auf allen Ebenen sehr gut dargestellt:Von der Vorkriegszeit über die ersten 2 Jahre des Krieges und den Anfang von Barbarossa geht es dann über Lend-Lease zur internationalen Politik der Alliierten. Es gibt sehr viele Details und noch andere Themen aber das ist der grobe Überblick.Positiv:- guter Schreibstil- viele Details (manchmal zu viele)- häufige Einblicke in Stalins, Roosevelts und Churchills Sicht- mögliche Erklärungen für Ereignisse- neutraler Blick, keine Vorliebe für ein Land/ eine Person- wichtige Personen werden genau betrachtet- sehr ausführlich (alle Länder und Kriegsschauplätze)Negativ:- einige seltene UngenauigkeitenFazit: Man ist um einiges schlauer nachdem man das Buch gelesen hat. Der Einblick in die internationale Politik ist vor allem sehr interessant und informativ

This is one of those books you can hardly put down. Written with great verve, attention to detail (despite a few minor factual errors), and focused on the mendacious and malicious role of Stalin during the Second World War, this is a must read book, one that won't be welcome to those who continue to ignore the Stalinist legacy - too bad the KGB man in the Kremlin isn't likely to read this book (but then his grandfather was a Chekist who loyally served Stalin, and his father was with the NKVD and did the same thing, and Vlad does so embrace the Soviet myth). Anyway, if you get one book about Stalin and the Second World War this should be it - definitive!

What a revelation as to who was the greatest statesman of the Twentieth Century, Stalin wins hands down he ran rings around everyone else.And the world is still paying for their ineptitude today, only now Putin has taken over his mantle.

Lectura necesaria para desmitificar y entender qué es el estalinismo y el enorme daño que hizo a Europa y que aún 70 años después sigue haciendo a países como Cuba.

久しぶりに読んだ第二次大戦史。この作品を読む経緯はすでにblogに挙げた。前評判にたがわぬ面白さ、あっという間に完了。全体で800ページ。本文は670ページの大著。本書の類書との違いは以下の点だろうか。これらの点は従来の正統史観では無視されていた論点だ。まず、独ソ不可侵条約締結後のスターリンのやりたい放題の侵略行為が詳しく分析されている。資本主義国の間での戦争を利用して、ポーランド分割、バルト併合、フィンランド侵攻、ルーマニアからの領土割譲など、スターリンはヒトラーと並ぶ侵略の「共犯者」なのだ。決してヒトラーの侵略の一方的な被害者ではない。特に1941年の６月以前には。「侵略のパートナー」から「被害者」へのイメージ変更が巧みに行われているのだ。ソ連側の対戦準備は着実に進められており、遅かれ早かれ、どちらが先に手を出すかは別にして、独ソの間に戦争は起きていた。次に、巨大な米国の対ソLend lease programe (一種の武器貸与計画：LLP)の役割と実態が詳細に解き明かされている。従来は、もっぱら対英支援の観点からのみ語られていたこのLLPだが、本書では、ソ連の戦争遂行を支えたという観点から、詳しく語られれている。武器（飛行機、戦車、弾薬）だけでなく、戦略物資（鉄、アルミや金属資源）、科学技術さらには衣類、食糧（バターや肉の缶詰）にまで範囲がか含めた巨大なLLPの規模は驚くほどだ。これほどの援助が、米国の参戦以前に秘密裏の内にソ連に供給され始めたのだ。特に初期の時点では英国への供与部分がソ連に回されて（regift)いるほどだ。また対英LLPには厳しい供与や返済条件が付けられたにもかかわらず、対ソLLPはほとんどスターリンの言いなり。決定的な時点（モスクワ、スターリングラード、クルスク）でのこのLLPのmarginalな、しかし決定的だった貢献が本書では指摘されている。さらには本来は独ソ戦でのソ連の巻き返しに伴い縮小されるべきだったこの対ソLLPだが、ソ連の対日参戦を支える形で1945年まで継続しているのだ。結局のところ、アメリカの経済力(Capitalist rope)を通じてソ連というモンスターの誕生とその東欧占領を助けたという結果になっているのだ。あれ、これは米国の対中関与政策の帰結と同じじゃないか。この奇妙なほどまでのソ連への入れ込み。類書では、ハリー・デクスター・ホワイト（HDW)などに代表される米政権内部のソ連のスパイの暗躍が強調される。本書でも、その浸透度合いについてはもちろん言及されるが、むしろ強調されるのは、最高指導者ルーズヴェルト大統領（FDR）とチャーチルの対ソ宥和への変貌ぶりだ。特に突出しているのが、FDRの奇妙なまでの対ソ宥和政策。ここに絡んでくるのが、FDRの個人的なアドヴァイザーとしてスターリンに接近したハリー・ホプキンス。この両人の奇妙なまでの対ソ宥和政策ぶりがこれでもかというほど全編を通して語られる。「カチンの森」などのソ連の虐殺事件の露呈などにもかかわらず、ほとんど見返りなしの援助をずるずると続けていく。FDRの死まで変わらないまま継続される。このFDRという人物の頭の中とその謎はいまだよくわからない。ところで、英国へのLLPの返済は2000年代まで続くのに対し、ソ連へのLLPはそのほとんどが返済されないまま1951年に処理されているようなのだ。戦後ドイツ経済の壊滅を狙いとしたグロテスクなMorgenthau planと「無条件降伏」ドクトリンの導入へのFDRの決定的な関わりも問題だ。特に後者はドイツや日本の抗戦意欲の枯渇を遅らせることにより、結果としては、ソ連の東欧占領、さらには東アジアでの共産主義の浸透を助けることになったというわけだ。スターリンの戦争は1945年の時点では終了しない。その後も、戦火の終了にもかかわらず、大量の敵国捕虜（独伊日）の強制的な労働への動員、ソ連の帰還捕虜の収容所送り、国内での諸民族の強制移住など、ソ連の経済は一種の「奴隷労働」を前提としたまま継続しいていく。奴隷労働に依拠する異形の経済なのだ。さて、本書の弱点はというと、日本への言及がかなり限定的な点。日ソ中立条約、南進への決定やゾルゲ、尾崎秀実などの暗躍、HDWなどによるハルノートへの関わりさらにはソ連の対日参戦への言及はあるが、全体でのウェイトはかなり小さい。そう米国はあくまでもヨーロッパ戦線を第一とした戦略を取っており、対日戦はあくまでもその次の優先順位しか与えられていなかった。欧州以上に交渉では解決できない大きな論点はここにはなかったのだが、その内実が詳しく扱われることはない。さて、最後に読後感として残ったのは、いったい「15年戦争」などと言う「共同謀議」に基づく長期戦を遂行したのはどこの国だったのかという素朴な疑問。資本主義諸国間の矛盾を利用して戦わせ、漁夫の利を狙う、そして領土を拡大し、資本主義国の援助(capitalist rope)と敗戦国からの資産の現物徴収（booty)と人的資源の徴用で、経済を成り立たせる、これこそが一貫したスターリンの戦略だったのだ。