Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (PSI Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era)

"Counterinsurgency Warfare" by David Galula is a classic in the works on insurgency and counterinsurgency. Galula lays out both the theory and practice of insurgency and coutnerinsurgency in the most succinct prose and complete prose of any work available. The great value of Galula's book is the clear road map for opposing an insurgency. Caveat; clear is not necessarily simple, and even if it is simple, to quote Clausewitz "Everything is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult." "Counterinsurgency Warfare" makes it clear that a counterinsurgency campaign is more about domestic (for the afflicted nation) politics and law enforcement than it is about the use of traditional miltiary combat power. In the words of Galula, "a mimeograph machine may turn out to be more useful than a machine gun" (a mimeograph is an archaic, low resolution printer, for the younglings in the audience). The only aspect of insurgency that I would have liked to seen explored a bit more explicitly would have been the role of sanctuaries for insurgents. There are some references to insurgents having access to areas outside those controlled but the government they oppose, but the need for either exterior sanctuaries (like the Vietcong use of Laos and Cambodia, or the way Iraqi insurgents have trained in Iran) or interior sanctuaries ('no-go' zones like the FARC and other narco-terrorists establish, or parts of Sadr City) for insurgents, and the reciprocal need to for counterinsurgents to deny sanctuaries to the adversary was not expounded on. The other shortcoming is that Galula was writing in the 1960s. While there have been linear, evolutionary improvements in small arms, and other military technology, there has been explosive change in communications technology since this book was written. The role and impact of internet and cell phones is far beyond what Galula had experienced in his lifetime, and has had significant impact on the conduct of insurgency and counterinsurgency. If you have any professional or personal interest in insurgency or counterinsurgency, this is a "must read". E. M. Van Court

In "Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice", David Galula draws upon his professional experience (largely his time as a Company Commander and Battalion S3/XO in Algeria, as recounted in Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958 to define a theory of counterinsurgency. Written in a similar timeframe, and shaped by almost identical experiences, to Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency (PSI Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era) , Galula's work has many similarities but in my view does a better overall job of both outlining a theory of counterinsurgency and offering a coherent and viable methodology of countering it. With an intellectual start point that "an insurgency is a competition between insurgent and government for the support of the population, which provides the sea in which the insurgent swims", Galula clinically describes the key features and strengths of insurgent and counterinsurgent forces and proposes clear principles for counterinsurgents. He does offer some intellectual challenges for conventionally-focused soldiers (see Galula in Algeria: Counterinsurgency Practice versus Theory (Praeger Security International) for an interesting examination of just how successful Galula's own operations were) but avoids some of the more dramatic and controversial prescriptions advocated by Trinquier. Although clear, straightforward and persuasive, this book isn't just full of good news - of particular importance is the observation that "the counterinsurgent is tied to his responsibilities and his past ...a counterinsurgent can seldom cover bad or nonexistent policy with propaganda" (read as "Information Operations" or perhaps even "Twitter and Facebook posts" for the modern day). Perhaps even more important is the observation that, given the disparity of resources required by a counterinsurgent to exercise its responsibilities for security and governance compared to an insurgent, "intensity of efforts and vastness of means are essential". This is sobering and unwelcome news to Western political and military leaders looking for quick, inexpensive solutions through "shock and awe" or UAV strikes against insurgent leadership. While Galula was a product of his time and focused on the insurgent/counterinsurgent dynamic of the Cold War, in my view many of his principles have far wider applicability across a range of peace support and stabilization operations as well. Every serious soldier should be at least familiar with his arguments - in many respects, I would consider this as a useful companion to the far more recent The Utility of Force as a means to understanding modern military and security issues.

French Colonel David Galula wrote Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, originally published in 1964, while at Harvard University’s Center for International Affairs. Many of Galula’s guidelines about counterinsurgency were developed from observations of the Chinese Communist Revolution, the Greek Civil War, the Malayan insurgency, the Vietnamese Revolution, and the Algerian Revolution. While Galula provides intelligent analyses, he at times makes statements that seem contradictory such as suggesting (2006, 9) that the insurgent attracts support through what he says he is going to do, rather than through what he actually does. But this is not consistent with what Galula states is the insurgent’s, as well as the counterinsurgent’s, goal of attracting and holding onto popular support. Mao Zedong, identified by Galula as a major authoritative source on revolutionary warfare, emphasized that it is crucially important for the insurgent to gain popular support by what he does, not just says, by acting in ways that are viewed as beneficial by the majority of the people. Another indication of Galula’s fallibility was his underestimation of the favorability of conditions for the Viet Cong in South Vietnam (2006, 71). Galula points out that insurgents and counterinsurgents compete in the context of assymetrical warfare. The initially weak insurgent force uses methods suited to its limited capabilities. The counterinsurgents, according to Galula, should use tactics that take maximum advantage of counterinsurgent strength. Although the insurgents, for example, are often highly mobile and can choose when and where to attack, the population supporting the insurgents is generally stationary and much more vulnerable. Galula claims that it is usually more effective for the counterinsurgent force to concentrate on the population, rather than focus primarily on physically eliminating the insurgents. Galula (2006, 49-60) defined victory not only as the elimination of insurgent armed forces and their organizational infrastructure, but also the isolation of insurgents from the population through the efforts of the population itself. He argues that one commander must have total control of counterinsurgent actions. Galula also says that counterinsurgent forces must constantly adapt to changing circumstances and even consider using coercive measures such as withholding jobs or food until the population in a targeted area cooperates with counterinsurgent efforts (Galula 2006, 71-72). He also asserts that the insurgent force must be denied any safe areas to regroup or organize. Counterinsurgent forces must also be aware of any divisive characteristics of the population, economic, ethnic or religious, that could be used to the benefit of either insurgent or counterinsurgent forces. Many of Galula’s ideas are reflected in Petraeus and Amos’s (2006) Counterinsurgency Field Manual for the U.S. Army and Marines and were applied in Iraq as described in Chapter 9 of The Iraq War: Origins and Consequences (2010). .

If Israel would employ this strategy in dealing with Hamas, Hizbollah and Fatah, I am convinced they would be able to achieve a lasting peace with the Palestinians. The ultimate goal of an effective counterinsurgency is to win the hearts and minds of the people themselves -- to establish yourself as the protector of the people in turning the tide against terrorism and the urban guerrillas who exploit the civilian population and endanger their lives and well being by hiding among them. General David Petraeus has already offered his expertise to the IDF and has toured the Middle East, visiting Lebanon, Syria, Israel, Jordan, Egypt and the Palestinians themselves. Indeed, Petraeus is the world's foremost expert actively working in the field of counterinsurgency technology and wrote the forward to the latest edition of this classic. He now uses it to train the American military and it's principles became the foundation of "The Surge" in Iraq, which has miraculously begun to achieve stability there despite doubts expressed by Petraeus that it was already too late after Rumsfeld's brutal policies radicalized the entire region and turned the civilian population against "The Great American Satan." Currently, the IDF is conducting the same conventional military strategy in The Gaza that renders short-term gains against the Hamas insurgents but sets the Israels up for a long-term struggle. Rumsfeld's strategy in destroying Fallujah twice over with air strikes and heavy artillery is the classic example of this self-defeating brutality. Israel's debacle in South Lebanon in 2006 is another. The fact that Israel refuses to deploy the more functional and civilian friendly counterinsurgency suggested by Galula and Petraeus can only indicate one tragic conclusion -- that Israel intends to hang onto a quixotic and archaic strategy of expansionism against the native Palestinians, institutionalized in the late 40s by the government of David Ben-Gurion. The strategy is that of early 20th century Zionism and its goal of recreating the Davidic Kingdom of a "Greater Israel." The continued stubborn use of this strategy has led to polarization and radicalization of the native populations in the Middle East, resulting in a strident, Jihadist Islamism we see today. The United States alone has the influence and responsibility to insist this effective counterinsurgency strategy upon Israel in the interest of a lasting peace in the region. Again, it's hallmark is its overall goal of winning the hearts and minds of the people themselves. Yet, American politicians continue to speak of "surges" in conventional military terms without having a clue about what they speak. This book should be read by every member of Congress, by Obama's Chief-of-Staff Rham Emmanuel, by his National Security Adviser General Jones, by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, by Obama and Biden themselves and by every member of the Israel Lobby who are so obsessed with the security of Israel that they don't see the solution under their noses. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (PSI Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era)

This book covers the steps that governments need to take in order to effectively end local insurgencies by rebel groups. The ultimate message of this book is "to build or rebuild a political system from the ground up". This essentially means that governments that want to eliminate insurgencies, must work with the local population to create a better system to effectively meet their needs. When the desires of the people are not met, then they will support violent groups that promise them better. Although written decades ago, the principles are still valid. When reading this, I thought that these concepts could be used by Israel to create a sustainable government in the Palestinian territories.

This is the definitive book on Counter-Insurgency concepts, and is the counter-insurgency counterpart to Mao's "On Guerilla Warfare" guide to insurgency operations. It clearly and concisely (134pp) shows what insurgency is, what counter insurgency is, and how they differ. It presents a roadmap to executing a logical, methodical, and effective counter insurgency program. Many of the factors involved in the success of the US surge in Iraq (effective clearing operations, followed by decentralized "hold" operations, information warfare, inclusion of the population and all aspects of govenment and state, etc....) are discussed here. It stresses the primacy of political tools over military, and offers and astute psychological analysis of the motivations and risk-aversion of the populace to supporting a legitimate govenment. It answers many of the key questions such as "why doesn't the population rush out to support us even though we are clearly working for their best interests?" If you want one book that draws together the theory and doctrinal ideas of how counter insurgency works, this is it.

Mr. Galula has captured in this small volume the essentials of counterinsurgency warfare. While dated in some respects, his book provides exacting and honest details in the difficulties of counterinsurgency---as we are witnessing in Iraq (his experience was in Algeria). Wisely, the US military is augmenting their doctrine with his sage advice. While the USMC's Small Wars Manual works well for the nuts-and-bolts of occupation and administration, Mr. Galula provides the tactical necessities and practical solutions. The success of his philosophy is, no doubt, responsible for the measured success of recent changes in US military activity of Iraq. The book is frank in describing the real challenges, and also the uncertainty of victory. The US military has been transformed over the last ten years, becoming more expeditionary and nimble---thus more capable of counterinsurgency and guerrilla warfare operations. This book should be required reading for members of Congress (particularly the "cut and run" crowd) and the administration. It is only through a proper understanding of the enemy and their tactics that a military force can capably and successfully engage and gain victory. Get this book if you want to understand what our men and women in uniform are facing in the war on terror. Insightful and informative from cover to cover. Highly recommended.

Having lived through the 60s and Viet Nam, I can recognize much of what is in the news today - just change the names. The type of war we now face has had many names: revolutionary war, counterinsurgency, counter terrorism, guerrilla warfare, asymmetric warfare, and so on. One size does not fit all, and it would be a fool who believes that there is a one-for-one match between conflicts. It would also be a fool who ignores the practical, political, and theoretical basis for such conflicts and the extent to which they share characteristics. This book addresses more the military end. This is not in any way a criticism. This book is very well written and well worth the reading. At the time it was written, armies were attempting to build a doctrinal base to use in such conflicts. In doing so, they also concentrated on the military. Again, this is not in any way a criticism, for doing so is their job. The political aspects of such conflicts are, properly, the job of the civilian leadership. The Iraq conflict, and the war in Afghanistan, have brought the subject again to the world's attention. My personal opinion is that many are now busy re-inventing the wheel. For anyone interested in the subject, many books are available. The best of the recent publications is General Sir Rupert Smith's The Utility of Force. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007. Carl von Clausewitz edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. On War. is a given, as is Sun Tzu, and Mao Tse-Tung's, Selected Military Writings. Peking, PRC: Foreign Language Press, 1966. Smith gives the best account of the need for combining all factors in a situation such as we find ourselves in now. Wesley Clark also does a good job of describing the complicated nature of modern conflicts. Other books are listed below, in no particular order. The (H) and (P) indicate if the book is hardcover or paperback. Thompson, Sir Robert. Defeating Communist Insurgency, The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Pbulishers, 1966. (H) Hart, B. H. Liddell. Strategy. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1954. (P) McCuen, John J.. The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War. Harrisburg, PA: The Stackpole Company, 1966. (H) Paret, Peter and John W. Shy. Guerrillas in the 1960's, Revised Edition. New York: Frederick A. Praaeger, Publisher, 1962. (P) Paret, Peter. French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria, The Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1964. (H) Guevara, Ernesto "Che." Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1961. (H) Bern, Major H. von Dach. Total Resistance, Swiss Army Guide to Guerrilla Warfare and Underground Operations. Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 1965. (H) Guevara, Ernesto "Che". Guerrilla Warfare, A Method. Peking, PRC: Foreign Language Press, 1964. (P) Clark, General Wesley K.. Waging Modern War, New York: Public Affairs Books, 2002. (P)(Original Source) Clark, General Wesley K.. Winning Modern Wars, Iraq, Terrorism, and the American Empire. New York: Public Affairs Books, 2003. (P)(Original Source)

I found about this book on a recent issue of "Foreign Affairs (vol.92/1, page 75). It seems that it had a major influence on general Petraeus and on the USA counterinsurgency field manual of 2007. It is a really absorbing reading for its clarity, logical depth and underlying experience. David Galula was a French officer and served in WW2 and then in China, Greece, Indochina and Algeria. He died in 1967and the book is particularly based on the operations in the wars in those areas.. Its first and major point is the "asymmetry" between Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, arising from the disproportion of strength at the outset and from the difference between their assets and liabilities. The established armed forces find their training, organization and weapons largely irrelevant to the new task and need to re-adjust to a new form of warfare in which the object is not killing enemies but to control and gain the support of the population. The book details the prerequisites and doctrine of Insurgency, as applied with success by Mao Tse-tung .and the Vietminh, as well as the failures in Greece and Malaya. The second half of the book presents a sharply clear analysis of the strategy, tactics and operations of Counterinsurgency. Four laws are listed as essential: 1) support of the population is necessary - 2)support is gained through an active minority - 3)support by the population is conditional - 4) intensity of effort and vastness of means are essential.. The strategy must be based on a step-by-step approach, selecting areas and making their control irreversible. The tactics require single direction, with the primacy of the political over the military power, coordination of efforts, primacy of the territorial command, adaptation of minds and of the armed forces to the new requirements. The last chapter, "Operations" , details eight steps to apply in each selected area: 1) expulsion of the insurgent forces - 2) deployment of static units in close contact with the population, while a mobile unit is kept ready to intervene where and when necessary - 3)contact with and control of the population 4) destruction of the insurgent political organization - 5) local elections - 6) testing the local leaders - 7) organizing a party - 8) winning over or suppressing the guerrillas. The book is only 99 pages long but its depth, clarity and concentration of logics, common sense and practical examples, make its reading a really unforgettable experience.One really feels to have learned a lot and to be more prepared to understand the present and more recent military events.

O livro é muito interessante, estrutura é boa, qualidade do livro é bom. Quem quer saber sobre rebeliões e contra insurgencia - recomendo

The classic review of counterinsurgency warfare, written in the early 1960's. Concise, clear and direct in dealing with the principles for both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent.

„Counterinsurgency Warfare“ by David Galula is a brief but striking handbook on the concept of insurgency, its variations and effective countermeasures against it with still great relevance for present situations. Written as a manual for military readers in 1964 Galula’s book provides a comprehensive understanding of the concept of insurgency in a brief and clear language. Although this might seem as a too academic angle on the topic, it is to be noted that Galula was one of the first to describe insurgency in such a way and thus lay the foundation of a thorough understanding of this kind of warfare, regardless of a specific national scenario. Thus he detached and abstract description of factors, means and effects is not to be seen as a fault, but rather a feature as he provides a framework of reference to use in a variety of conflicts. Although writing in 1964 Galula already addresses the majority of factors like the asymmetry between forces, prerequisites for successful insurgency, the doctrine to follow and possible angles of effective counterinsurgency correctly and in a surprisingly modern way. His understanding of counterinsurgency is clearly population-centric with intelligence lead operations to deny the insurgent control over the population. Although the formulation of the phases of an effective counterinsurgency campaign may appear overly simplistic, they should only be seen as a generic template for application in a specific scenario. Still Galula already understood the need for political legitimacy of a counterinsurgent government and thus also the need for political reform of the same to win elections and politicize the population by giving them a stake in the political confrontation. For all modern and reform-oriented thinking Galula is clearly not above critique. Although he does not overtly advise or discuss torture, like Trinquier does, there can be no doubt Galula also sees the need for the counterinsurgent to act against identified insurgents with the utmost ruthlessness. He views insurgents as enemies of the state and the people to be suppressed by overwhelming military force and not dealt with like criminals by the police. His application of military force, population control and intelligence operations, shaped by experience in Indochina and Algeria would not have been in alignment with modern limits to such endeavors. Overall Galula’s book is a dated but still very relevant and correct treatise on the subject of insurgencies and because of his briefness and directness a good starting point for anybody starting to read on the topic of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies.

I needed to carry out some research for a presentation, I bought this book along with two others. This uses a wealth of examples to help understand key insurgency/coin concepts. My pages are now covered in extra notes(pencil) which I can only take as a good sign. I really couldn't put this book down. The author effectively argues through the key points of a COIN model. Which actions have worked , which haven't as well as the motivations and catalysts for insurgency itself. A very balanced book, and a great read. Very happy with my purchase. I would especially recommend to anyone employed in the military or military environments.