Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East

Because I live in the United States, I knew next to nothing about the Six Day War of 1967 prior to reading this book. Michael Oren does a fantastic job of setting the stage (the overwhelming majority of the book takes place before the conflict) by giving a thorough historical perspective of the Arab-Israeli conflict from 1947, and also describes the role of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and other Arab countries leading up to the war. The book also does a great job at setting the immediate stage for war, discussing the border conflict between Israel and its neighbors, and particularly Syria's role in pushing regional actors to action. Additionally, Oren's description of the role of American and Soviet diplomacy in the buildup to war and the conflict's context inside the global Cold War is absolutely superb. The description of the action, when he finally gets to it, is also very good, and one gains a perspective of both the strategic situation, as well as the carnage faced by front line soldiers on both sides. This was a truly horrible conflict in which a large proportion of combatants on both sides were casualties, fought across three different fronts that saw everything from heavy air combat to sweeping tank battles to bloody urban warfare. Oren does a good job and moving from front to front in a way that isn't confusing, and goes into enough depth for each theater and battle, although the book is certainly more of a general overview than in-depth account of the battles. Oren also explains the strategic and territorial gains made by Israel, the war's geopolitical effects, and the temporarily crippling effect defeat had on Israel's Arab enemies. Overall, the book was fantastic, and a quick, comprehensive read for its heavier and unfamiliar subject matter. Oren spends a great deal of time leading up to the conflict, which may get a bit tiresome for some, but it is nevertheless interesting and I found it easy to absorb. Additionally, Oren's objectivity can be called into question as an Israeli and combat veteran of the IDF, however overall he does a commendable job of masking his own feelings and gives a very fair-handed account of the events that transpired. Overall, this book is a great piece of history, especially as an introduction to a lesser known yet vitally important event.

At first I was skeptical about this book. It's hard enough to get a balanced account of a battle without it skewing towards the victor, but then I heard the author is Jewish and he now lives in Israel (although he is of American descent). My thoughts were, how balanced can this account be? My fears were assuaged by the editorial reviews, and having read the book I can verify that it is as fair and balanced as possible, given the limitations placed on the author: namely, the lack of information forthcoming from the regimes that were on the losing side. I suppose this is understandable in the context of those governments - democracies like Israel (and the U.S.) declassify documents much sooner than other types of governments. This is further exacerbated by the fact that the leaderships of the losing countries are still in place - the Ba'ath Party in Syria, the industrio-military complex of Egypt, and the Hussein monarchy in Jordan. So, given that the account is scholarly and balanced, how does the book read? I was pleased to note that the author, Michael Oren, is an accomplished storyteller and the book mostly reads with all the spice and excitement of an early Tom Clancy novel. It flashes back and forth from the battlefield to the governments to the man on the street. More time must be spent on Israel, naturally enough, because the decisions were made by committees (when not made ad hoc on the battlefield). It takes some time to describe the arguments. In contrast, the facts that Egyptian decision-making structure was essentially non-existent, and that Jordan was an absolute monarchy, meant that there was little to report about internal politics in those countries. Oren is also adept at keeping an enormous cast of "characters" alive and in play - I never felt at a loss, even though this is the only book I've read on the conflict and was not even alive in 1967. This brings me two the first of my two criticisms of the book: there is not enough material on the actions of Syria and her government. Although Syria didn't do all that much fighting, they were certainly involved in both the diplomatic and military efforts. Even so, after having read the book I couldn't tell you the name of a single Syrian leader or general off the top of my head. This is is stark contrast to the amount of time spent in the Tel Aviv, Cairo, and Amman. The second shortcoming is the length of the narrative describing the diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis before the shooting started. Although necessary to fully describe the history of the conflict, did we really need to be told about every phone call between President Johnson and the Soviets? Every diplomatic overture from the U.N.? As such, pages 100-200 drag somewhat. We are ultimately rewarded by the quality of the narrative once the war begins, so ultimately it is worth the slog through the diplomacy.

Michael Oren has written a captivating account of the diplomatic, political, and biographical circumstances around the war the Israelis call 'The Six Day War' and the Arabs know as 'The June War'. As the glowing reviews, on Amazon.Com and elsewhere suggest, this is a captivating, well researched book, that will almost certainly be known as a classic. After an introduction which traces the Israeli-Arab conflict to the 1960s, Oren starts unrolling the events that lead to the outbreak of the war - namely, the boarder clashes between Israel and Syria, the attacks by Palestinian Militants (or terrorists, or revolutionaries, take your pick), and the counter attacks (or raids, or Imperialistic demonstrations of power) by Israelis. The crisis took an escalation with the evacuation of the United Nation Emergency Force from Egypt, thus closing Israel's red sea port, and the movement of Egyptian forces into the Sinai desert. Oren's description of the political forces at work, going back and force from Jerusalem, Cairo, Damascus, Moscow and Washington DC (with stops at Amman, Paris and the UN headquarters in New York City), is nothing short of masterful. He describes how internal power struggles within the Arab world and within Egypt moved Egypt towards a confrontation with Israel and the Unites States, and how political forces within Israel, as well as a wish to maintain close relationships with the US ruled Israeli political movements. I was struck by the major role U Thant, the Secretary General of the United Nations played in the conflict. By pulling the UN forces from the straits of Tiran that rapidly, Thant boosted Egyptian's pride. Had Thant stood up to Nasser, perhaps the war could have been evaded. Equally interesting is Oren's depiction of US President Johnson, heavily involved in the much criticized war in Vietnam, unable to give Israel the support that it asked for - and thus, in the eyes of the Israeli leadership, giving it the green light to strike. The attack, launched by Israeli airforce on the 5th of June 1967, caught the Egyptian unaware. Israeli operation Focus, the destruction of Egyptian air fields, was a resounding success. In a way, the war was already won. The greatest weakness of Oren's account is in the description of the military operation. Frankly, they were so confused, with hardly any maps, that I don't think you can understand much about the ground level events of the war, or about the military strategy at all the levels except the highest, unless you already know a great deal about it beforehand. This fault, however, does not really mar this otherwise excellent account, which goes on to describe the mix of responses in the Arab world, both desperation and euphoria (due to the phantasmagorial propaganda), the accusations that the US aided Israel (what Johnson called 'The Big Lie'), and the unfortunate attack on the USS Liberty by Israeli forces (Which Oren convincingly demonstrates was an accident). Most interesting, Oren describes the attempt to secure a cease-fire, and Israel's attempts to duck, delay and win time. After trying hard to avoid the war, Israeli leaders were unwilling to end it without a major change in the political landscape - the conquest of vast territories in the Sinai desert, the West Bank, and the Goal Heights. I was also amazed to read about the complete lack of strategic planning in the side of Israel. While military plans were finely drawn and perfectly executed, there was apparently no thought at all given to the goals of the war, beyond a somewhat naive wish to expand Israel's boarders and repay the Arab aggressors. Decisions such as weather to conquer East Jerusalem, to cross the tunnel, or to invade Syria, were done on the spur on the moment. Worse, they were often carried out not by the Government, but by the whims of Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan. This is perhaps the most extraordinary revelation I had while reading Oren's book - that Dayan, and virtually Dayan alone, decided almost all the important decisions of the war. Not Prime Minister Eshkol, not the Israeli government, and not the international community made the decisions. For better or worse, almost everything in the modern Middle East is the consequence of the solitary decisions of Moshe Dayan. Almost four decades later, in the middle of yet another wave of Israeli-Arab violence, I find that highly troubling, but strangely Ironic, and I fear that, in this regard at least, little has changed. In the event of an all out war, will the next forty or fifty years be decided by one charismatic leader in the Israeli cabinet?

Michael Oren is one of the very few writers on the Middle East capable of reviewing documents in English, Hebrew, and Arabic, without a translator. He is also educated as an academic and a historian, while experienced as a diplomat. This is an exceptional work, one good enough to impress the brilliant Fuad Ajami, who is sorely missed as one of the most exceptional of Middle East experts. This book is thoroughly researched - reflecting Dr. Oren's academic training. Although, looking at some of the reviews, this provides too many details, for those who are insistent upon seeing the basis for statements made, they will be happy to see the same documentation that bothers the more casual readers. Also, for those who found the book "too political" there is nothing about this book or its subject that is not political. I highly recommend this book, especially for those eager or interested in learning about what truly happened, and how a nation surrounded and vastly outnumbered by hostile enemies chanting for their blood, their death, and their destruction, managed in six short days to destroy the Egyptian Air Force on the ground and defeat the invading armies of Egypt, in Sinai, the Jordanians on the eastern front, and the Syrians in the north. Together with Iraqi forces, all were rejected and defeated soundly, with Egypt losing Gaza and the entire Sinai, Jordan losing the West Bank that it conquered in 1948, and Syria losing the Golan Heights, from which they had been raining down bullets, bombs, and artillery on Israeli farmers and civilians. Not only does Oren describe the battles, he goes into exquisite detail regarding the political machinations of the Israelis, the Americans, and the Arabs - all of which are essential to understanding what happened and its significance. This is an essential resource for university history instructors teaching about the Middle East, the development of modern warfare, and International Relations.

Very interesting and a great read

My review and point of view on Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East The Arab–Israeli wars remain some of the most controversial and debated topics in modern history. Michael Oren’s Six Days of War offers a detailed and well-researched account of the 1967 conflict, which came after decades of tension starting from the Arab revolt of 1936 and the subsequent Jewish uprisings. This period also included the 1947–1948 war, when several Arab armies intervened after the UN partition plan, leading to the creation of Israel and the displacement of Palestinians, and then the 1956 Suez Crisis. In 1967, the conflict reignited when Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran, expelled the UNEF peacekeepers, and deployed troops in the Sinai Peninsula. Israel then launched a preemptive strike that destroyed much of the Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian air forces. This enabled Israel to quickly capture the Sinai Peninsula and the West Bank, including Jerusalem, where Jordanian and Palestinian defenders put up a brave but ultimately unsuccessful fight, as well as the Golan Heights. One of the most controversial points, in my opinion, is the possibility that there were secret deals or understandings at the leadership level — for example, that Syrian leaders might have been willing to hand over the Golan Heights without telling the soldiers fighting at the front. The book also highlights Israel’s effective use of surprise and swift mobilization, which played a key role in the Arab defeat. In my view, the reasons for the Arab defeat included disunity, disorganization, overconfidence driven by propaganda, and poor coordination between the armies. Another controversial event was the Israeli attack on the USS Liberty, which some believe was an attempt to draw the United States into direct conflict with the Soviet Union. As for the USSR, although it supported several Arab states, it did not intervene directly, possibly because it had helped escalate the crisis initially through misinformation and political maneuvering. Overall, Oren’s book provides a thorough narrative based on documents and testimonies. Yet, like all histories of this conflict, it also invites readers to think critically about hidden motives, missed chances, and the complex political calculations that shaped the modern Middle East.

The events of June 1967 have been written about extensively. Never before, however, has a book been published that not only chronicles the six days of the war itself but also the factors which led to it. In this important new work, Michael Oren looks back and comprehensively examines each and every aspect of the conflict. Oren presents the history from a military, diplomatic, political and cultural perspective. Through the extensive examination of archives, official reports, memoirs and interviews with surviving figures, Oren details the roles played by all the major players from the perspective of, not just the Israelis but the Egyptians, Syrians and Jordanians as well as the United States and the Soviet Union. After beginning by presenting a brief synopsis of the Arab-Israeli conflict to that point, Oren describes the series of miscalculations by Nasser that led Egypt into war several years before he intended. A combination of Syrian bellicosity, support of Palestinian terrorist incursions in Northern Israel together with the goading of his unstable general Amer, led Nasser to force the United Nations out of the de-militarized Sinai and to illegally close the Tiran straits to Israeli shipping, tantamount to a declaration of war. As Oren clearly shows, war with Egypt was inevitable the moment the straits were closed. No sovereign nation could ignore a blockade of its shipping. Oren chronicles Israel's political struggle with the United States and the Soviet Union to permit an appropriate military response to Egypt's provocations.. Despite the clear act of war by Egypt, the Johnson administration, hobbled by Vietnam and fearful of a confrontation with the Soviets, urged Israel to show restraint. Oren describes the agony of Eskhol and the Israeli government in deciding how to attack preemptively without alienating the United States. In the famous meeting between Abba Eban and President Johnson, Johnson practically urged Israel to absorb a first strike. The execrable Charles De Gaulle did overtly demand this. Israeli military doctrine required the preemptive destruction of the enemy air forces. The tension drove Rabin to a temporary breakdown and probably took years off Eskhol's life. Once the war started with Israel's lightning strike on the Egyptian Air Force, Oren shows how events followed their own trajectory with Jordan drawn in and then Syria and Israel's military objectives changing on a constant basis. Indeed, what becomes clear is that Israel never had any particular political objective other than the elimination of the direct existential threat. Contrary to anti-Israel revisionists, Israel never had any specific designs on the West Bank or even the old city of Jerusalem. Ironically, the decision to conquer the old city of Jerusalem was not made until he last possible moment, even after much of the West Bank was already in Israeli hands. From the Arab perspective, Oren shows just how and why the war turned into a disaster. The Egyptian forces lacked any semblance of unified command or communications. Nasser's officers were afraid to tell him the truth. While her forces were in full retreat, her air force lying in ruins, Egypt continued to broadcast the basest propaganda that her forces were advancing towards Tel a Viv. Hussein, meanwhile, was trapped by his fear of Nasser and the Syrian radicals into attacking Israel in Jerusalem. Also fascinating is the extent to which political and diplomatic considerations played a role in military strategy and increased Israeli casualties. For example, Eskhol delayed for so long the decision to take the Golan heights, that the IDF was unable to take the proper preparatory steps which would have included artillery bombardments, air bombings and a night time attack. Instead the brave soldiers of the IDF advanced straight into murderous Syrian fire. This was true for the Jerusalem campaign as well. Ultimately, the value of this book is that it shows the context of the war. It is easy for revisionists to argue that Israel's conquests of the Golan and the West Bank were not necessary. What Oren shows is that, with the exception of Jerusalem, the Israeli offensives were not for the purpose of expanding Israel's territory but purely for geo-political diplomatic purposes. Once forced to fight, Israel was determined not to be forced to remain within indefensible cease fire lines as she was in 1948. There is no question that Israel's basic war aims were to eliminate the offensive capabilities of the enemies on her border and to force them to the negotiating table. Unfortunately, the nature of these regimes made a peaceful solution impossible and more bloodletting would be required. Oren contrasts the totalitarian Egyptian and Syrian regimes with the raucous Israeli democracy where decisions on basic war strategy were taken by consensus in the famous "pit". Oren makes a point of noting that, despite the general's dismay and outright disgust at Eskhol's restraint (borne of his fear of antagonizing the Soviets and the Americans), never for one moment did they consider disregarding his orders. The hallmark of a true democracy is the subordination of the military to civilian command. Nasser, by contrast, was in constant fear of military overthrow. Oren's dispassionate analysis reveals the positive and negative roles played by the major players in the drama. The Mercurial Moshe Dyan does not come across as positively as his reputation would suggest. His inscrutable nature would endanger Israel in 1973. Eskhol is fully exonerated. Indeed, when the full story is revealed, it is difficult to think of another Israeli political figure better suited to deal with the myriad of competing considerations. Nasser comes across as more deluded and broken than evil. Hussein appears to be a victim of forces beyond his control. The Soviets are revealed in all their villainy. This book is destined to be a true classic. It will be to the Six Day War what "O Jerusalem" is to the War for Independence. It is a must read for anyone interested in the history of Israel.

This was a very informative book about the geo-political events before, during and after the 6 day war. The casualties, be them political or physical, are astounding. It was fascinating to read about who Israel's true allies were at the time and the events affecting every single decision and action made between many different countries. However, there is so much detail and, in my opinion, irrelevant dialogue, I found it hard to be able to read this more than a chapter or even a few pages at a time. There is some historically significant and very eye opening information. Just SO detailed I felt like I was thinking "just get to the point already"! A lot of this book is fluff and frankly unnecessary to get the points and information across to its readers. Worth a skim, but reading it all word for word is a waste of time.

It was an enlightening read of the event that probably has shaped the present day middle east. It (thankfully) is not a run down of day wise event of the war per se, but an intriguing mesh of the events at tactical, operational, strategic, diplomatic, political & international level; nicely interwoven. An interesting read. highly recommend it for learners of military, diplomacy, international relations & history (of course!!!)

Eine Aufarbeitung mit neuem Quellenmaterial aller direkt und indirekt Beteiligten 30 Jahre nach dem entscheidenden Krieg im Nahen Osten machte sich der israelische Historiker und spätere Botschafter Israels in den Vereinigten Staaten (2009-2013) daran, den Konflikt mit einer Rundum-Perspektive und dem Vorteil eines gewissen zeitlichen Abstands aufzuarbeiten. Nicht dass es vorher an Darstellungen und Dokumentationen gefehlt hätte - im Gegenteil. Befehlsausgaben der kriegsführenden Länder sowie der Rückgriff auf amerikanische, russische, europäische und arabische Quellen (Befehlsausgaben, Berichte, Interviews, Zeitungsberichte, Memoiren etc.) sollen für eine ausgewogene Darstellung sorgen. Ich war erst etwas skeptisch, ob dies einem Israeli, der zudem noch als Politiker aktiv ist, gelingen sollte. Dieser nimmt für sich in Anspruch, seine Vorurteile und seinen Standpunkt in den Hintergrund stellen zu können. Tatsächlich wird in den Darstellungen stets reihum auf die verschiedenen Positionen, Perspektiven und Ausgangslagen Bezug genommen. Trotz allem ging es nicht lange (das mag an meinem eigenen Standpunkt liegen), dass ich Partei für die israelische Seite einnahm. Die Hauptbotschaft Auf Israels Seite gelingt es Orten sehr gut, die ständige Ambivalenz des Volkes herauszuarbeiten: Auf der einen Seite bestand die ständige Angst vor der Vernichtung. Diese war gekoppelt mit dem Anspruch auf Unbesiegbarkeit. Orten nennt schon am Anfang sein Mitgefühl für die ungeschickten Entscheide der ägyptischen Führer. Dies führt zur zweiten These: Der Krieg wäre u. U. zu vermeiden gewesen. Falschinformationen, Drohgebärden, aber auch die Wortbrüchigkeit der arabischen Verbündeten liessen den Druck ins Unermessliche steigen und die Eskalation beschleunigen. Die penetrante arabische Propaganda, die den Tatsachen direkt widersprach, wurde auf den Strassen nur zu gern aufgenommen. Motive, Chancen und Gefahren, die Willkür vieler Akteure und nicht zuletzt der Einfluss der beiden Supermächte USA und SU liessen die Lage schwer überschaubar werden. Auf israelischer Seite spart Orten nie mit enthüllenden Details wie etwa die Uneinigkeit der Kabinettsmitglieder oder das Schwanken der Heerführer. Die wichtigsten Figuren, vorab Rabin, erlitten einen Nervenzusammenbruch. Auch die Unentschlossenheit und das Zaudern des israelischen Ministerpräsidenten Eshkol kommt deutlich zur Sprache. Die arabische Seite kommt mit ihrer Wortbrüchigkeit, dem Machismus und den Partikularinteressen der Führer und Generale nicht gut weg. Sie zogen von Anfang an den Kürzeren. Orten verschweigt nicht die Rückschläge der Israeli oder die Tapferkeit der jordanischen Truppen. Weder die Verschwendungssucht der arabischen Führer noch die Tapferkeit und der Gemeinschaftssinn der israelischen Kampfeinheiten werden unter den Teppich gekehrt. Leseempfehlung Wer sich über die Situation im Nahen Osten ein historisches Bild machen möchte, kann dies exemplarisch am Sechstage-Krieg tun. Orten meint schon zu Beginn, dass sich die Lage nach 2000 nicht gross verändert habe. Die beeindruckende Fülle der Quellen wird in einer geschickten Anordnung der Darstellung verwoben. Die Detailtiefe bei den über 400 Seiten ist sicherlich enorm. Die klare Struktur (Geschichte seit 1900, direkte Vorgeschichte, ein Kapitel für jeden Kriegstag, Nachgeschichte) und die gut gewählten Untertitel lassen den Leser nie im Stich. Wäre der Krieg notwendig gewesen? Als Christen antworte ich darauf: Der Schöpfer, der alles ins Dasein gerufen hat, lenkt die Geschichte. Ein israelischer Soldat der Sinai-Offensive kommt zur Wort: "Es war, als ob Gott über uns gewacht hätte." Lernfelder Ich lese ein solches Buch nicht nur als spannungsgeladenen Kriegsbericht oder einen politischen Thriller. Darüber hinaus mache ich mir Gedanken über persönliche Lernmomente. 1. Wenn du einer Übermacht gegenüberstehst, dann musst du manchmal eine Flanke offenlassen. 2. Löse dich situativ schnell von einem bereits fix erscheinenden Plan. 3. Führer gehen durch schädigenden Druck von Entscheidungen. 4. Manchmal gibt es nur die Vorwärts-Strasse - trotz Verlusten. 5. Informiere dich sorgfältig über den Gegner. 6. Ziehe in Betracht, dass sich deine Position (und die des Gegners) seit dem letzten Konflikt verändert hat.

Livro bem específico abordando a guerra de todas as formas possívei, do nível político ao militar.

This book analizes the war from every point of view and you can see how the path to war is being constructed step by step. The book despite his lenght is readable and becomes highly addictive!

A well written book. ⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️