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The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy And Its Geostrategic Imperatives [Brzezinski, Zbigniew] on desertcart.com. *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy And Its Geostrategic Imperatives Review: Very informative - It is an excellent book. Very informative. Review: Not What I Expected From the Grandfather of the Neocons - My preconception of Dr. Brzezinski was that he was an unrepentant and virulent anti-communist Russia hater who would reflexively reject any suggestion of Russian/American cooperation. Not so. Based on my reading of this book. Although he advocate the expansion of NATO and the EU, he recommends it be done with assurances to Russia of peaceful intentions and with anticipation of Russia’s eventual inclusion, which he believes is Russia’s only option due to its location and European heritage. Although I had no established understanding of the author’s ideas regarding Asia I was nevertheless surprised at the degree of optimism he expresses in the ‘Grand Chessboard.’ His views regarding China were enlightened to say the least. Soft headed some might say these days. Although Dr. Brzezinski accepts the concept of the “Indispensable nation” and argues that.at the world needs the American hegemon, he does recognize that this dominance must diminish over time. Very surprised Although events have partially overtaken the premises of this book, reading it certainly contributed to my understanding of Cold War history. It also - lamentably I would say - gave me sense of what might have been. Highly recommended.







| Best Sellers Rank | #51,438 in Books ( See Top 100 in Books ) #21 in Globalization & Politics #108 in History & Theory of Politics #170 in International & World Politics (Books) |
| Customer Reviews | 4.6 4.6 out of 5 stars (754) |
| Dimensions | 5.5 x 0.75 x 8.25 inches |
| Edition | 2nd |
| ISBN-10 | 046509435X |
| ISBN-13 | 978-0465094356 |
| Item Weight | 9.3 ounces |
| Language | English |
| Print length | 256 pages |
| Publication date | December 6, 2016 |
| Publisher | Basic Books |
O**A
Very informative
It is an excellent book. Very informative.
G**U
Not What I Expected From the Grandfather of the Neocons
My preconception of Dr. Brzezinski was that he was an unrepentant and virulent anti-communist Russia hater who would reflexively reject any suggestion of Russian/American cooperation. Not so. Based on my reading of this book. Although he advocate the expansion of NATO and the EU, he recommends it be done with assurances to Russia of peaceful intentions and with anticipation of Russia’s eventual inclusion, which he believes is Russia’s only option due to its location and European heritage. Although I had no established understanding of the author’s ideas regarding Asia I was nevertheless surprised at the degree of optimism he expresses in the ‘Grand Chessboard.’ His views regarding China were enlightened to say the least. Soft headed some might say these days. Although Dr. Brzezinski accepts the concept of the “Indispensable nation” and argues that.at the world needs the American hegemon, he does recognize that this dominance must diminish over time. Very surprised Although events have partially overtaken the premises of this book, reading it certainly contributed to my understanding of Cold War history. It also - lamentably I would say - gave me sense of what might have been. Highly recommended.
S**A
Strategic political reading
Great reading. If you want to know how political chess is done? Then this book is a must read.
E**S
OBAMA'S FOREIGN POLICY, PARTLY EXPLAINED
Here is the second edition of a well-known text on how the United States should interact in diplomacy with the nations of the Eurasian continent. The 1997 edition is reprinted unchanged, with a four-page epilogue chastising the US for engaging in unilateral wars, for "failure to prevent the emergence of a significant power rival" and for not "preventing global anarchy". "A framework of cooperation and pressure is needed in order to promote long-term collaboration between all three sides: China, the problem of the future; Russia, the disrupter of the present; and the United States, the aging superpower caught in the vice of history." I would add that the dominant power must be willing and able to act alone at times. In the first edition, the author described the US as the hegemonic (dominant) nation and added, "America's global primacy is directly dependent on how long and how effectively its preponderance on the Eurasian continent is sustained." The author never mentions the military power underlying the primacy, but the factors which sustain power such as economic strength and prestige. From this vantage point, US hegemony has decreased since 1997, but we cannot be sure how much. Some of the decrease resulted from budget sequesters, some from lowered American morale (and lowered foreign esteem) due to the problematical war in Iraq and the financial crisis of 2007. (The author's 'Strategic Vision' spells this out in detail). Clearly power in this overall sense is difficult to evaluate. But the US remains dominant and this is as it should be. "A world without U.S. primacy will be a world with more violence and disorder and less democracy and economic growth than a world where the United States continues to have more influence than any other country in shaping global affairs." In a burst of plain speaking the author says the imperatives are "to prevent collusion and maintain security dependence among the vassals, to keep tributaries pliant and protected, and to keep the barbarians from coming together." (p.40) The first task in understanding the strategic game is to identify the resources and dispositions of the players. The game is played on an oblong chessboard called Eurasia with the US on one side and China on the other. The author identifies five countries that are "major and active players" (France, Germany, Russia, China, and India) and other countries (Great Britain, Japan, and Indonesia) of lesser importance, which although important, do not qualify as major players. The distinction is in their political and diplomatic dynamism. The two major players on the Western side are France and Germany. Both are motivated by a vision of a united Europe, though they differ on how much and in what fashion such a Europe should remain linked to America. Five additional countries are "pivots": Turkey, Iran, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine. Their importance is in being adjacent to two or more important areas such as the Caspian Sea or another country's mineral deposits, frequently near to adjacent countries that are major players. Turkey is one example, adjacent to the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. South Korea, between China and Japan, is a Far Eastern pivot. The author is concerned that the US-European alliance should be a true unity. So Washington must treat Europe (NATO and the European Union) as equal to it in all respects, even in view of the larger financial contributions of the US to NATO. To make Europe more united and more independent, America must "throw its weight behind those European forces that are genuinely committed to Europe's political and economic integration. [I don't know why Europe should need American help with this.] Such a strategy will also mean junking the last vestiges of the once-hallowed U.S.-U.K. special relationship." (p. 50) The demarcation between the European part of Eurasia and the Asian part is related to a system of human rights issues and an all-embracing domestic social and economic benefits. (This is explicitly stated in his book 'Strategic Vision".) The presence or lack of the system is part of "the international democratic and cooperative order." that is to be projected by an enlarging Europe into Eurasia. He considers Ukraine and the Baltic States to be European, while Turkey is on the way to becoming European (perhaps because it is a NATO member) and Russia is not so far along. Russia is considered rather savage and needs taming by Europe. I do not know the exact basis for his evaluations, but I cannot agree with him that Russia, a country that has produced Nobel prizewinning scientists and writers, should be rated below Turkey. My reason is that within common sense a country should be allowed to have its own values. China and Japan are simpler to deal with than Europe because the situation is simpler and there are fewer alternatives. The author feels that America should be a natural ally of China because it has no designs on the Asian mainland and has historically opposed both Japanese and Russian encroachments on China. All the same, many Chinese see the US as constraining their country's influence merely by being so large and so powerful. Even if China grows at its rate of ten percent for 25 years it will still be be a very poor country. (Fact check: as of 2013, China's GDP per capita was $6807, higher than other Southeastern Asian countries while much lower than Japan's $38633.) There are contentious issues between China and other Asian countries but to me they appear small. Concerning the Taiwan issue, he suggests "one China, several systems", a natural addition to Hong Kong. But China is making this natural step difficult. In the Epilogue, the author comments "The majority of Americans are largely skeptical of US involvement in world affairs." Being one of them, I understand their skepticism; the demands on the US seem excessive and contradictory.
V**A
Must read
The best book in strategy and geopolitics I’ve read in a while. It has aged well, and remains very relevant.
S**A
Geopolitical classic
If you want to understand the conflict un Ukraine, read this book. A classic
S**P
Timed perspective for early 90s
Outdated but a decent perspective for that time in history
K**R
A great read.
A fascinating read. The topics and challenges outlined by the author, over 30 years ago, are still relative today. Well thought out.
S**H
Although written in 1997 one of the best and most relevant books on geopolitics and foreign relations I ever read. Z. Brzezinski, both as intellectual and as practitioner, and H. Kissinger are the two most important and influential global foreign policy thinkers of the 20th century. Thoroughly enjoyed the author's unrivaled insights into Europe, Asia-Pacific, and everything in between on this giant landmass called "Eurasia". This work helped me to make sense of some of the madness happening these days anywhere between continental Europe and the South China Sea.
P**H
Good read
M**O
Libro imperdibile se vuoi capire il mondo di questi decenni
J**A
Gran análisis hecho en 1998, en el que advierte de los problemas que se ocasionarían si EEUU no actuaba adecuadamente (como ha sucedido). Predice la crisis de Ucrania. Muy bien escrito y explica los conceptos de la geopolítica con claridad. El análisis de Rusia y lo que llama los Balcanes de Asia central (lo que hay entre Rusia, Turquía, irán e India) es buenísimo. Libro importante para complementar nuestra visión eurocéntrica y entender mejor las preocupaciones de Rusia. Importante tener en cuenta que esto es anterior a Putin y describe los desafíos que tenía Rusia por delante. Los mapas y cuadros son imposibles de leer en la versión Kindle.
A**A
While the world has rapidly changed in the years since its original publication, most of the global issues presented in Brzezinski’s masterly work are still faced in the present. Eurasia is undeniably the center of global power. If the United States wishes to maintain its mantle as a global superpower, it must preserve its dominance of the continent. Brzezinski exhibits the dangers to US primacy as France, Germany, Russia and China. Should Europe unite, a goal that France and Germany continue to strive for, America would lose its center of authority on the continent. At present, Europe relies on American hegemony and leadership in its global policies. As 27 (previously 28) relatively small independent nations, the EU cannot negotiate on a global scale with the same authority as the US (or increasingly China). However as one nation and one voice, Europe would be able to dominate the global stage alongside the US, causing dual hegemony (perhaps even surpassing it with France’s global outlook). America must decide whether it is in its interest to support a strong Europe as an ally or prevent its unification, maintaining global mastery. Russia’s modern history has left many scars on its national identity; from defeat in the Russo-Japanese war to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Perhaps most impotently the loss of Ukraine. This has left Russia with the gnawing question “what is Russia?” An empire? Not without Ukraine. An Ideology? Not without the Soviets. A Superpower? Not without either of the previous two. But the far more appropriate question for the US is ‘what should Russia be?’ America and the West must decide if they will embrace Russia, or leaver her in the cold. The answer will determine the future of American primacy, for better or worse. In 1997 China was still emerging as a global power. Reading this work in 2021, it is hard to ignore Brzezinski’s prediction that ‘even by the year 2020, it is unlikely even under the best circumstances that China could become truly competitive in the key dimensions of a global power.’ It is true, that China is not yet a global power (it certainly has the muscle to be, but not yet the influence). However, one cannot shut one’s eyes to the rapidity with which China has risen to rival the US. China, not Russia, is the true threat to American primacy. Brzezinski predicts in his conclusion that America will not remain the sole superpower forever. No one could have predicted in 1997 that the US would elect President Trump. Nor could they predict he would be replaced by Joe Biden. These historic elections do not bode well for the Pax Americana. With China on the rise, Russia in limbo and Europe stagnant, we wait with bated breath to see what is yet to come.
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