How Hitler Could Have Won World War II: The Fatal Errors That Led to Nazi Defeat Paperback – December 11, 2001

Like a chess master, the author describes the moves that Hitler could have made that might have won the war for Germany. His explanations are completely coherent and feasible. His descriptions of Hitler's mistakes are so rational that you, the reader, always understand why what might have been could easily have happened if Hitler had listened to his Generals and tempered his megalomania. The most chilling moment in the war's history was after Hitler conquered and overran France. If he had listened to his generals at that point in time, he could have committed at least four armored divisions to North Africa in order to conquer Egypt and the rest of North Africa, subjugated the Middle East, isolated Turkey and taken over the Baku oilfields in the Caucasus in order to insure he had enough oil to supply his war machine. Russia would probably have been taken out of the war, and Hitler and his hideous regime would have become impregnable. The author points this out with terrifying clarity. This book is a must read for World War II history buffs.Phillip Rohlin

Hard core World War II history buffs are going to find a great deal here that already are familiar with in terms of blunders - the pause at Dunkirk to let the Luftwaffe finish off the British, the invasion of the Soviet Union, the last throw of the dice in the Battle of the Bulge. But Alexander does an excellent job of explaining these in detail to the casual reader, as well as painting an excellent overall portrait of the strategic, operational, and tactical blunders made by Hitler that could have changed the course of the war. Even experienced readers will find some interest in the smaller, often overlooked decisions - like the decision to target Crete rather than Malta - and will certainly receive some overall value from giving this a read.Most importantly however, is that Bevin leaves a powerful impression on the reader of how close Nazi Germany was to victory at multiple stages of the war - where a more thoughtful application of manpower here and there might have had truly dramatic consequences. And these kinds of books are always useful (as they are in the U.S. Civil War context) in challenging the arguments that these kinds of wars were foregone conclusions given industrial/economic disparities between the two sides.Other reviewers have made this point, but worth repeating that it pairs very nicely with Richard Overy's Why the Allies Won so you get a similar look at the other side of the equation. Both are a strong recommendation!

It's a well-written and cogently argued history of Hitler's military adventures in World War II, but you'd be disappointed if you expected something like a dozen chapters, each devoted clearly to one of his blunders. I sort of imagined: Chapter One, Hitler Didn't Invade Great Britain. Chapter Two, That Moron Invaded Russia. Chapter Three, The Numbskull Invaded Crete Instead of Malta. But it's not organized like that at all. Instead a reader will get an overall view of Hitler's aims, how he set about achieving them, and how and why they were frustrated by the Allies.I suppose in some way it's accurate to say that more detail is given about some of the confrontations at the expense of others, but you get enough information on the various campaigns -- the men and equipment and strategies -- to satisfy most of us. I was happy to see so much space devoted to the North African campaign. It's usually neglected, for reasons I don't fully understand. And Bevin Alexander advances the proposition that, had Hitler handled Africa differently, there would have been no need for an invasion of Russia.That's a pretty outrageous proposition but the book is full of them. There's a lot of conjecture going on. I'm not enough of a military historian to judge them but some seem to violate common sense. I'll give an example, though. If Hitler had kicked the British and Commonwealth forces out of Africa early on, which he was in a position to do, he would have had all of the Mediterranean Sea to himself, along with the oil supplies in the Middle East."Even more important, the Soviet Union's major oil fields were in the Caucasus and along the western shore of the Caspian Sea, just north of Iran. Germany could not only threaten an attack directly from Poland and Romania in the west but also from the south through the Caucasus to the Soviet oil fields. This danger of envelopment and quick loss of oil would immobilize Stalin, and obligate him to provide Germany with whatever grain and raw materials it might need. In other words, Germany -- without loss of a single soldier -- would have the benefits of the Soviet's vast material storehouse, as well as delivery of tin, rubber, and other goods from Southeast Asia by way of the TranSiberian Railway (pp. 50-51)."Well, is that what Stalin would have done -- really?Alexander skips quickly over one important error that has nothing to do with military strategy and everything to do with what's been called simplex thinking in psychology. Hitler had come to hate Jews and to regard Slavs as an inferior race, literally. But he made a simple logical mistake, one that most of us make from time to time. He lumped together everyone living within the borders of the Soviet Union. Instead of recognizing the diversity within the adversary, he was unable to see anything important in the way of differences. (Some of us are making the same error today when we talk about "Iran", as if it were some monolithic community in which everyone thinks alike.)The fact is that Stalin was recognized by many in the Soviet bloc for the murdering egomaniac he was, especially in regions like the Ukraine, that in some ways thought of itself as an occupied territory. The Ukrainians applauded the appearance of German troops after Russia was invaded. But this meant nothing to Hitler. Rather than defining himself as a fake "liberator," which is what most modern invaders would do, he considered himself a conqueror and treated the population accordingly. Behind the front-line troops came the Einsatzgruppen. These were ordinary Germans, clerks and haberdashers, whose job was to exterminate Jews and other undesirables. Of those who were left, many were conscripted into labor details. Good conquerors, like good psychologists, don't make mistakes like that.But then Hitler was full of misconceptions about the world he lived in. He persisted in maintaining them, ignoring any contradictory evidence, and finally lost the war. Alexander's book successfully outlines, in greater or lesser detail, how this might have been avoided.

Como regalo esta espectacular, solo que el de pasta blanda no me gusta es muy sencillo. Me guasa más el de pasta dura. En la descripción tiene mapas muy buenos. A mi novio le encantó.

Professor Bevin Alexander's work is insightful and wonderfully written. This study offers a fascinating analysis of how different decisions could have made a remarkable difference especially during the early war years. His chapter on Rommel's "gift" during the early part of 1941 is a must read for all history buffs interested in the North African campaign. It will make you wish some one would produce a table top war game or computer simulation to play out the possibilities discussed in this detailed, plausible historical scenario.

I enjoyed this book though I was a little disappointed after I finished it. The author tried to show how Hitler could have won the war but most of the time I felt that he fell short of the mark. The author kept repeating that the only reason Germany lost the war is because of Hitlers madness thoroughly discounting the efforts of the Allies, especially Sir Bernard Montgomery for the British and almost every American General except General Patton who he fawned over throughout he book.

I liked this Book

As described

Found it to be a good read and interesting.Told it how it was and the mistakes made.Worth it.

Aunque el libro parece analizar las posibilidades de una estrategia diferente para Alemania en la WWII, lo cierto es que, la mayor parte del libro, es un análisis de la historia militar de la WWII. La tesis inicial es interesante aunque no es especialmente novedosa. Según ella Alemania podría haber ganado la guerra concentrándose en el sur y en el Mediterráneo. Esta tesis ha sido analizada por diversos autores y, aunque merece un análisis, no parece totalmente creíble porque, sin duda, habría encontrado problemas similares a los que tuvo la expansión en Rusia, especialmente si los nazis hubieran seguido con sus políticas racistas.Pero, lo cierto es que el libro no analiza esta posibilidad en serio sino que es un resumen de la historia militar en el norte de Africa, Rusia y las acciones en Normandía, lo que se aleja del título del libro y lo convierte en una historia militar relativamente convencional.

Educational