The Economic Consequences of the Peace - Classic Illustrated Edition

It is the current fad to say that Keynesian economics is dead, probably never worked, and is the root of Socialism. You wont hear that from anyone who has studied economics though, anyone with an IQ above 90. If anything Keynes supported capitalism and this book demonstrates that very clearly. Now he was an economist and a good deal of the book can be difficult to read because he goes into great detail to support his conclusions but then his conclusions were so different from the dominant world opinion of the time (this was written just after the armistice) that he had to go into detail. He demonstrates how Germany could not pay the debt the allies were imposing, would eventually renege, and how this would result in a world wide depression and war. Considering when he wrote this work that is a pretty genius observation since it all came true. He also gives interesting assessments of everyone involved as well as their motives. In a nutshell he advocated rebuilding Germany, after replacing their government, into a trade partner which is exactly what Truman did with both Germany and Japan after WW II. He also wanted Europe, and this got him in trouble though the book doesn’t say that, to accept their portion of the burden for starting WW I. This is the best book I have ever read on the reasons for WW I and also the reasons for WW II.

This is one of those books that I've been meaning to read for many years and after completing it I think it was a fantastic example of the best that Keynes has to offer. More of a history lesson than economic policy book, this book is a great example of first account history and Keynes' tone and opinions are very enlightening. I have studied many accounts of WW II but I am trying to expose myself to WW I and this book does both a great job of explaining what happened to Germany and Europe after WWI. This then leads to the twenty years between the next conflict. Keynes explains via economics why Germany felt the pressure of the treaty. In summary, a very good book of course.

I decided to read Keynes not only because he was a great economist, but also because the lessons (that the great man offers in his book) are golden. The lessons Keynes offers - on human nature, economics, geography, polity and society - are worth remembering in a conflict ridden world. For instance, "collective animosities" that plagued Europe after world war 2 still plague the world today. The tide of nationalism, protectionism is growing stronger. Free trade is under threat. Keynes gives a very strong message "When good men fail to act, the consequences are disastrous." Thus, economic aid and empathy with others is more important than imposing sanctions under national pressure. France and Italy, using their temporary victory, imposed a humiliating treaty, inviting "... their own destruction also, being so deeply and intricately intertwined with their victims by hidden psychic and economic bonds." Don't make the mistake of reading this book as the one on Treaty of Versailles. It is a book on negotiations, structured arguments, analysis, war, conflict resolution, human nature and politics. It holds the potential of shaping your perspective of contemporary Europe and the World. What more can I say other than: READ, Re-Read, Re-Re-Read, ...... It's a golden treasure.

On every page, John Maynard Keynes shows the inevitability of World War II with minute detail. The politics of war did not stop on Armistice Day. Germany was put in an impossible situation. The French were the main culprits; Great Britain and the other allies fell in line for unreasonable reparations. America lead with ambivalence in the European resolution. In no way does John Maynard Keynes and this reviewer move by extension to what the Germans did was a normal reaction to their economic penalty,

A youthful John Maynard Keynes, having endured what for him as an honest Englishman and one who possessed such a brilliant , rich turn of phrase, redolent of any historian of any time, in my opinion, has written the definitive reasons for the utter failure of the Treaty of Versailles to even have any prospect of being successful in any way, and that is because the allies simply overreached in their political desire to so humble Germany, the real engine of growth in the economy of Europe, that the most likely consequence of such a political, fiscal political and public humiliation of Germany would likely see a war within less than 20 years. How could the economic engine of Europe of 1914 possibly pay reparations that were far more punitive than realistic, and, in his view, would never be repaid when her ships were sunk or given away to th the allies, their railway capacity was going to be so degraded that it was not much better than nothing? But let me conclude with some words from his very first paragraph:"Very few of us realise with conviction the intensely unusual, unstable, complicated, unreliable, temporary nature of the economic organization by which Western Europe has lived for the last century. We assume some of the most peculiar and temporary of our late advantages as natural, permanent, and to be depended on, and we lay our plans accordingly.On this sandy and false foundation we scheme for social improvement and dress our political platforms, pursue our animosities and particular ambitions, and feel ourselves with enough margin... to foster, not assuage, civil conflict in the European family. Moved by insane delusions and reckless self regard the German people overturned (these) foundations........... But the spokesman for the French and British peoples have run the risk of completing the ruin which Germany began...." He concludes his fairly short 116 page book with this dedication: we have been moved already beyond endurance, and need rest. Never in the lifetime of men now living has the universal element in the soul of man burnt so dimly... To the formation of the general opinion of the future I dedicate this book."

The econometrics are always boring to me and Keynes does on for a long time about that. He took like 7 pages just to say that Woodrow Wilson was an aloof, impatient, incompetent, and passive player that was in more of a hurry to get the Armistice over than see it done correctly. Keynes went on and on about how Wilson was outmatched by European leaders, but never got into psychoanalyzing anyone but Wilson and the French leader. I thought that was overkill and incomplete writing by Keynes. Perhaps Keynes was just being loyal to his native England and didn't want to give away any intelligence through his opinion of the leaders of England or their political tact. I am only half way through the book at this point. But, I am already starting to understand how German industrialists were thinking when Adolf Hitler came along a decade later. Germany was absolutely raped beyond justice economically and there was no chance for free market competition with the reparations placed on them after WWI. As usual, the more I trace back into history the more it makes sense and this books opens up and explains a lot of what was going on at a major economic and political shift that was the Treaty of Versailles.

Excellent basic review of the Clemenceau plan. Tells of an ineffective Woodrow Wilson who was obviously outclassed by Lord George and Clemenceau. Shows how a few Elites decided the economic future of Europe hoping to place Germany back into the 1870s. As usual, Belgium, Italy, Germany, Austria, Hungary, all the Balkan states and even Russia had no say in the "Redistribution of Wealth". Wilson has no plan! Lord George couldn't get Wilson to a more moderate plan. Clemenceau got his way and Europe was set up for WW II. Excellent analysis of economic factors that molded the future of Europe

Absolutely a must read for either the history or economics (or 20th century warfare) folks out there. John Maynard Keynes writing, so soon after the end of hostilities in 1919, is written from a true insiders perspective. His assessments of conditions at that time and their likely playing out have proven in long hindsight spot on. In all cases except the Soviet Union (in my opinion) his predictions, based on economic data and human nature (not politics, revenge, greed, nationalism, etc) are frankly so accurate as to amaze me. Keynes lived until 1946. It is clear to see his influence on the "modern" (post WWII) world. It is a sad fact that this book and its message were largely ignored until the second war, with negative consequences to the between-wars Europe (and world) that can hardly be overstated. Finally, his descriptions of the main individuals involved in the "peace process" and their strengths/weaknesses/perspectives is as relevant today as it was then, for the individuals have changed with the generations but the same forces that shape policy are still at work.

Mais que um livro de economia, história ou sociologia. Um relato de quem acima de se suspeita que viveu um momento histórico

The approach and perspective that are provided, are just as important to decisions today as it was when written. This is an exercise in judgement and fairness

Parigi, 1919, la guerra è finita da qualche mese e le quattro potenze vincitrici (USA, Gran Bretagna, Francia e Italia) si riuniscono a Parigi per discutere i termini della pace. Per gli Stati Uniti parteciperà il Presidente Woodrow Wilson, per l'Inghilterra il primo ministro LLoyd George, per la Francia il presidente Clemenceau e per l'Italia il Presidente del Consiglio Vittorio Emanuele Orlando. Nello staff inglese sarà anche presente Keynes che non sarà d'accordo con le condizioni estremamente dure che saranno imposte alla Germania, (soprattutto dalla Francia, ma non solo). Infatti Clemenceau vede nella fine della guerra, solo l'ennesimo, ma non ultimo, set di una lunga partita mortale contro la Germania. Pertanto la Francia vuole diminuire la differenza di popolazione e il gap tecnologico che ha con la Germania, per affrontare il futuro match. Keynes vede in questa politica punitiva i prodromi per una rivoluzione nei paesi sconfitti e una futura guerra in Europa, ma, novella Cassandra, non verrà ascoltato e la strada per Hitler e la Seconda Guerra Mondiale verrà spianata. Il Presidente Americano l'unico che può impedire questa politica punitiva (anche perché è l'unico a non avere la Nazione sull'orlo del fallimento economico), nel corso della Conferenza di Parigi lentamente perde la propria credibilità a causa della sua inadeguatezza a livello politico (Keynes lo definisce un buon ministro prebisteriano, con ottimi principi di giustizia e correttezza, ma un pessimo politico). Feroci sono anche le critiche al Primo Ministro Britannico Lloyd George, per avere indetto le elezioni anticipate a fine 1918 al fine di capitalizzare politicamente la vittoria nel conflitto. La vittoria nelle elezioni sarà ottenuta solo promettendo al popolo britannico riparazioni irrealistiche che la Germania non potrà mai ripagare. Anche l'Italia viene accusata di richiedere riparazioni di guerra irrealistiche. C'è da dire che comunque Keynes, in un certo qual modo, capisce le posizioni dei vincitori che hanno sì vinto sul campo di battaglia, ma che si trovano in una situazione economica disastrosa (soprattutto Francia e Italia) e che sono alle prese con milioni di uomini feriti e di famiglie che hanno perso le loro fonti di sussistenza nel corso del conflitto e che hanno promesso tanto ai propri popoli, ma poco possono mantenere. In ogni caso, grazie ad una attenta e ragionevole analisi economica, egli dimostra che la Germania e i suoi alleati non saranno mai in grado di pagare quanto richiesto e che, anzi, proprio queste richieste irragionevoli porteranno i paesi sconfitti in una crisi economica con conseguente diminuzione della possibilità di pagare. Quindi non è neanche nell'interesse degli alleati imporre tali condizioni capestro. Il libro, nonostante sia scritto quasi cento anni fa, mantiene una carattere attuale e, anche se scritto in un inglese non molto semplice, si legge tutto di un fiato. Keynes dimostra di essere un essere pensante, scevro da pregiudizi e meritevole della fama che tuttora ha

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Una edición horrible. No se entiende que cuando reeditan un clásico no se esfuercen un poco más