The Bank That Lived a Little: Barclays in the Age of the Very Free Market

Too much detail for the lay reader and not enough for the expert. The author seems to have spread the net too wide. The lay reader is presented with titillating accounts of the joys of turning left on an aircraft, the luxury of suites in 5* hotels and annual bonus packages larger than the person-in-the-street might earn in a lifetime. However, such a reader is also expected to understand without further explanation why equity might be thrown overboard from investment banking, but not fixed income.On the other hand, the expert reader (in which camp, I place myself) has experienced these titillations first-hand and may not feel greatly titillated. However (s)he will want more detail than "a back book of derivatives with risk that stretched out for decades".The physical descriptions of the principal players suggest the author is hoping to sell film rights - a quixotic hope indeed. The quality of the information is very patchy, presumably reflecting the varying quality of the author's sources. We are given extensive detail about one non-exec's antipathy to Diamond's bonus package one year, but very little detail about the LIBOR scandal.The author seems out of his depth in various acronyms - VIX, VaR and SIVs spring to mind. The expert will know what these represent and will want detail about the bank's exposure. The lay reader is fobbed off with inadequate and occasionally downright wrong - e.g. VaR - descriptions.There appear to be a couple of fictional characters introduced. William The Thinker starts off as a young new hire at an unnamed hedge fund and is credited with extraordinary prescience about Barclays share price, earning the fund many millions and himself vast bonuses. There's insufficient information even to try identifying him. Karl Edwards is presented as a Barclays customer owning a small company in Birmingham who was badly ripped off by a structured interest rate collar forced on him by Barclays. Googling reveals no hits for a company with the company name given and the only Karl Edwards of any relevance seems to be a Barclays Birmingham relationship manager (same bank, same location, only on the other side of the relationship fence), who was gaoled for five years for defrauding Barclays customers. If these are fictional representations of actual situations, the author should have told us.Rereading this review makes me think of a 2*, rather than a 3*, rating, but I shall stick to the 3* because parts of the book - especially the boardroom battles and the dealings with the regulators - are very informative. Perhaps the book can be likened to Longfellow's little girl who had a little curl right in the middle of her forehead "When she was good, she was very good indeed. But when she was bad she was horrid."

Thoroughly good read that gives you a good feel on the transformations and tensions inside the financial sector and its regulators through the changes at Barclays

Every shareholder of Barclays should read this book. Culture and transformation of Barclays was very well documented.

For someone who works at at Barclays and knows a lot of these players it was a very interesting and informative read !!!

Very well written, thorough research and factual.

This is a good book – it’s an interesting story, briskly told and the author has clearly done a lot of background work and - from my own knowledge – it’s largely accurate. It’s important for me to make that point as I’m mostly going to comment on things which are less good.I should also add that I was there for some of the time and much involved in some of the events described in the book, so while this gives me an ‘insider’ perspective it might also be said this is at the price of objectivity.I’ll begin by getting one thing off my chest – I simply hate books that feel the need to say things like “[Bob Diamond] sat down in a small coffee chop, ordered a small cappuccino and stared out through the condensation dripping down the window pane”. How could Philip Augur possibly know this – he wasn’t there and nor was anyone other than Bob and, believe me, Bob did not contribute to this book. I know it’s meant to add ‘colour’ but it simply sounds naff.More substantively some of the emphasis or lack thereof on elements within the overall story are a little odd (and perhaps betray who some of his sources are). In the early part of the book one is left with the impression that nothing of importance ever happened at Barclays without the involvement of one individual and the recruitment firm he worked for – I don’t think so.The book rather oddly suggests that John Varley and Barclays played a bit of a blinder by pulling out of the bid for ABN Amro. The truth is, had it not been for an even bigger fool in the form of RBS outbidding Barclays, it would have made the acquisition and Barclays would have gone bust, as ABN was a vastly overvalued bag of nails.The first of the huge fund raisings involving the Qataris, which was of enormous importance and has had consequences to this day, is covered in one short paragraph.Augur claims he can’t say anything about the allegations which surround the second and even larger fund raising on the grounds that the matter is ‘sub judice’ but there is no reason he could not summarise the key points and developments as they have already been reported in our newspapers.In contrast Amanda Staveley is given far greater prominence and is treated with much greater respect than the facts warrant. I would say that her ‘contribution’ to the transaction was zero or even less than zero if that’s possible and many at Barclays considered her to be something of an embarrassment or even a joke.There are relatively minor factual errors in the book. For example, the participants on a crucial call with Tim Geithner are incorrectly stated; some of the sources quoted in the notes are wrong and many are no longer available; and giving as a supporting source for quite an important statement ‘bbc.co.uk’ is simply inadequate.The story of how Barclays came to buy much of Lehman Brothers is well told and I think an exciting story in its own right. But part of the story is a little jumbled and perhaps I can clarify this aspect. In the book it is explained that Barclays needed shareholder approval to acquire Lehman (while it was still solvent) but the US authorities wished to announced the deal on the Monday morning, so Barclays needed the US to ‘backstop’ it for weeks until a shareholder meeting could be held. This is technically correct but incomplete. The reality was the US was only being asked to provide a very theoretical guarantee in the event shareholders rejected the acquisition. I say theoretical because it was inconceivable shareholders would not approve the deal (the board would have resigned on mass had this happened and was prepared to make this clear) and in any event the large institutional shareholders would have given undertakings to vote in favour the next day, so the US risk window was extremely small.Perhaps more important is that Barclays made a judgement that the US authorities were bluffing in saying there would be no public support for Lehman, because the consequences for the financial system in the US and more widely should Lehman go bust were too grave to accept. Barclays was both wrong and right at the same time: wrong because the Americans were not bluffing and Lehman went under but right because had the US correctly foreseen the consequences - which were traumatic and deep - it would have stepped in, as it then had to do on a much larger scale to prop up AIG just a few days later. If the concern was ‘moral hazard’ it made no sense to let Lehman go and then as a result, be forced to bail out AIG and many other institutions.But now I’m commenting upon what is not in the book, rather than what is and what is there is an interesting and important story told well and with pace and drama.

The company wrestled with the decision whether to proceed along the traditional banking lines it had evolved since its formation in 1690 or a more adventurous international investment banking style yielding very high rewards for the staff making profits and/or in senior positions.Unfaltering directional guidance was very mixed from the Board of Directors, both Executive and Non-Executive resulting in a lack of directional clarity.A very well written and riveting account of navigational conflict that might give guidance to other large organizations on the importance of clearly identifying and tightening of corporate goals.Highly recommended.

As someone who lived through the events at Barclays, I thoroughly enjoyed the read. The book is well written and provides an insight into a period in Barclays history when it dared to challenge the global bulge bracket firms. My only criticism is that, in this age of a blame culture, at times the context in which events happened are not seen as fully as they might. This is a complex subject and includes coverage of a very turbulent economic period, so it is difficult to get a total balance in perspective.

I thought it wonderful. It read like a thriller, a real page-turner. I also found it extremely educational. I only wish I'd read it before becoming a non-executive director of a financial institution. It would have helped me enormously in getting to grips with the challenges of the role. I would highly recommend it for anyone in a similar position - executive or non-executive. Not only is the author a former banker, he's also a historian. It shows - to the reader's benefit

Great history lesson with some useful insights. However, I found the writing style irritating. The author has tried to build an image of the scenes where crucial decisions were made. But the level of detail can only have been fiction, thus casting doubt on the authenticity of the whole story. Next time, stick to the facts please. The story is dramatic enough without needing embellishments.